Child Custody Problems in Illinois by Taylor, Leigh H.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 24 
Issue 2 Winter 1975 Article 14 
Child Custody Problems in Illinois 
Leigh H. Taylor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Leigh H. Taylor, Child Custody Problems in Illinois, 24 DePaul L. Rev. 521 (1975) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol24/iss2/14 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CHILD CUSTODY PROBLEMS
IN ILLINOIS
Leigh H. Taylor*
Professor Taylor delves into the perplexing problems encountered
in the area of child custody. The author traces the development of jud:cial
decisions, noting that the major deficiency is the absence of judicial guide-
lines in determining the best interests of the child. He suggests that the
child's best interest should be viewed in the light of our present changing
society, and admonishes archaic deference to the nineteenth century
philosophy which presumes the mother can best fulfill the needs of a
child, and does not take into account the physical and emotional charac-
teristics of each parent.
ESOLVING parents' competing claims for the custody of their
children continues to be one of the most perplexing problems
of the judicial process.' In most areas of the law, the trial
judge fashions a remedy after determining the present legal rights
of adverse parties who have formulated an adequate factual rec-
ord. However, in a contested custody proceeding the trial judge
must frequently make a disposition between two equally qualified
and fit parents, aided only by the principle that his "guiding star is
and must be at all times the best interest of the child." 2  Charac-
terized as "the best interest rule," this principle focuses upon the
child's well-being, and hopefully implements the societal interest in
insuring an environment in which the maximum potential of each
child may be realized. The best interest rule is a legal conclusion
which is properly utilized only after all factors affecting custody
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, DePaul University, College of Law;
Visiting Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the assistance of the following DePaul law students: Ronald Roesser,
Mark Stavsky, and Jeanne Toussaint.
1. Judge Botein observed that "[a] judge agonizes more about reaching the right
result in a contested custody issue than about any other type of decision he renders."
B. BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 273 (1952).
2. Nye v. Nye, 411 Il. 408, 415, 105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (1952). Cf. Comment,
The Best Interest of the Child-The Illinois Adoption Act in Perspective, 24 DEPAUL
L. REv. 100 (1974).
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have been considered, balanced, and weighed. Yet, often the ap-
plication of the rule, especially in appellate decisions, is merely a
sweeping dogmatic statement.
While a number of factors have been identified as relevant to
custody determinations,3 many decisions, are simply statements of
results accompanied by skeletal factual accounts with little or no
attempt to support the results in reason. These opinions fail to
build ,the necessary bridge between the facts and the authorities on
the one hand, and the result that is reached on the other. Frankly,
-their precedential value is limited.
This Article will focus on three areas of custody recently exam-
ined by Illinois appellate courts: grandparent visitation, the tender
years doctrine, and the repose of former custody decrees. These
3. While no single factor necessarily controls, the following chart from Oster,
Custody Proceedings: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAM. L 21,
22 (1965) indicates the type of factors which courts utilize:
JUSTICE
DISCRETION OF THE COURT
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
I I I I
-Child Health Sex Age Fitness of the Parents
Preference Physical I
& Mental i I
Moral Fitness Love, Affection Parent's Ability
I of Parent for to Provide
Child Physically,
Marital Character iMentally,
Misconduct of the Financially
Parents
See generally Callow, Custody of the Child and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, 18 S. DAK. L. REV. 551 (1973); Lyon, Awarding Custody in Illinois-Review
of the Factors Considered by the Courts, 11 DEPAUL L. REy. 42 (1961); Weinman,
The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW & CONTEMp. PRoB. 721 (1944). Section
402 of the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (1973) provides:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of
the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes 6f the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or'
parents, his siblings, and any other person 'who may significantly affect the'
child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. The court
shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his
relationship to the child.
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three areas.provide a framework in which -to consider the ba-
sic problem in custody proceedings: the failure of the Illinois courts
.to.provide comprehensively reasoned opinions.
GRANDPARENT VISITATION
In Boyles v. Boyles,4 the Third District Appellate Court held that
the custodial parent could not prevent grandparents from visiting
,their grandchild. After reiterating -the best interest rule, the court
concluded:
[Elvidence was presented as to what was in the best interest of this
child who had just lost his mother and who was close to his maternal
grandparents whom he had Visited every day prior, to his mother's death.
We believe where a .parent has died, the continuation of the relationship
between :child and grandparents, which may be promoted by visitation,
may be a positive benefit affecting the best interest of the child.5
It is fair to ask what specific interest of the child is served by per-
mitting grandparents to visit: is it -the interest in -the continuity of
affection-relationships;6 is it the interest of preserving, to the ex-
tent possible, normal and traditional family relationships which in-
clude grandparents; 7 is it the judge's perception of the child's wishes
.to visit with individuals with whom he has developed a psychologi-
cal relationship;" or is it some other interest. The decision may simply
be a recognition of grandparents' rights clothed in the best interest
rule to avoid the* harsh -but logical application of the parent's ex-
clusive right to custody under the parental right approach.9 Boyles
4. 14 Il. App. 3d 602, 302 N.E.2d 199 (3d Dist. 1973).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Kewish Y. Brothers, 279 Ala. 86, 181 So. 2d 900 (1966). See J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973). The authors place the interest in continuity of affection relationships above
all other interests.
7. Cf. Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, 330 Ill. App. 506, 71 N.E.2d 920 (1st Dist. 1947).
8. See generally GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 6.
9. The fact that the grandparents love the.child is no cause to give them a
legally enforceable right to have. the child visit with them ... It is surely
to be desired that the child will be able -to enjoy the love and.affection of
her grandparents and that they in turn will be able to enjoy the love and
" affection 'of the child.. But -this desire: does not justify interfering With the
proper and normal parent-child relationship.
Thomas v.. Pickard, 18 N.C. App. -1, 5, 195 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1973); accord, Lee
v.. Kepler, 197 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1967); Green -v. Green, 485- S.W.2d 941 (Tex.'Civ.-
App. 1972). In Lucchesi v.- Lucchesi, 330z II'. App.:.:506, 71 N.E.2d 920 (1st Dist.
1975]
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raises, but fails to adequately resolve, a number of questions: do
all grandparents have rights to visitation, or only grandparents who
have maintained a close relationship with the child, or only those who
cannot visit their grandchild because of the death of the child's
parent?'0 Are these rights of visitation limited to grandparents, or is
there, for example, a right to visitation by a step-parent who through
death or divorce of the child's biological parent, has no practical
opportunity to visit the child?
In contrast to the Boyles rhetoric, Lucchesi v. Lucchesi" is cer-
tain and comprehensively reasoned.
A decent regard for the wishes of the dead, for the natural feelings of the
petitioners, and for the right of the child to meet and know her grand-
parents, should cause respondent to voluntarily perform her plain duty in
this matter without the pressure of a court order.1 2
The equivocal nature of the Boyles court's conclusion leaves one
with the impression that the court was not convinced it had cor-
rectly decided the case. Yet such timidity is unwarranted by the
factual situation. In -the absence of evidence that some harm will
result to the child'" or to the relationship of child and custodial
parent,' 4 it is clear that there will be a positive benefit to the child from
grandparent visitations. 15 The underlying questions Boyles raised may
have been answered if the court had taken greater care in identifying
the interests involved and in providing a more thoroughly reasoned
opinion.
1947), the court recognized the parent's right to exclusive custody but held that it
was not materially abridged by grandparents' visitation. See Gault, Statutory Grand-
child Visitation, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 474 (1973); Veverka, The Right of Natural Par-
ents to Their Children as Against Strangers. Is the Right Absolute?, 61 ILL. B.J.
234 (1973).
10. Cf. Solomon v. Solomon, 319 Ill. App. 618, 49 N.E.2d 807 (1st Dist. 1943).
11. 330 Ill. App. 506, 71 N.E.2d 920 (1st Dist. 1947).
12. Id. at 512, 71 N.E.2d at 922.
13. See, e.g., Kay v. Kay, 51 Ohio Op. 434, 12 N.E.2d 562 (1953). In Common-
wealth v. Dratch, 192 Pa. Super. 1, 159 A.2d 70 (1960) the court ordered visitation
by grandparents despite psychiatric testimony that such visits might not be in the
child's present best interest.
14. See, e.g., Burge v. Burge, 88 Ill. 164 (1878); Commonwealth v. Sharp, 151
Pa. Super. 612, 30 A.2d 810 (1943).
15. Visitation may lessen the effect of separation which has been likened to an
orphaning. Comment, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes
Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 161 nn. 43 & 44 (1963).
524 [Vol. 24:521
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THE TENDER YEARS DOCTRINE
Another area of uncertainty is the application of ,the "tender years
doctrine" to custodial dispositions. This doctrine is a presumption
that the mother is better able to care for children of 'tender years
than the father and that unless she is found to be unfit, or unusual
circumstances compel a different result, the mother should normally
be granted custody.' 6
For over a century, Illinois has embraced this doctrine. In Mi-
ner v. Miner,17 the supreme court first articulated the best interest
rule as the proper alternative to the common law rule based on
property, which automatically granted the father custody of the
child.' The court indicated that the best interest of the child must
control and that this would be guaranteed by granting custody to
the child's mother.
It is upon this consideration that an infant of tender years is generally
left with the mother, (if no objection to her is shown to exist,) even
when the father is without blame, merely because of his inability to bestow
upon it that tender care which nature requires, and which it is the peculiar
province of a mother to supply.19
The court reasoned that to grant custody of the child to the father
would result in her being cared for and educated by a non-biologi-
cal parent because of demands on the working father's time. Con-
versely, the unemployed mother's time and ability to care for and
educate the child were seen as critical. It is apparent that the
court's decision was based on its notions of biological motherhood
and the fact that the mother's societal role in 1849 gave her the op-
portunity ,to personally care for the child.
The Miner conclusion could have been reached without the aid
of a specific doctrine favoring the mother if the court simply had
analyzed the factors affecting the child's best interest. The cultural
milieu of the nineteenth century which dictated the roles of mothers
16. See, e.g., People v. Bukovich, 39 II1. 2d 76, 233 N.E.2d 382 (1968); Draper
v. Draper, 68 Ill. 17 (1873); Wolfrum v. Wolfrum, 5 Ill. App. 2d 471, 126 N.E.2d
34 (3d Dist. 1955). But see Carlson v. Carlson, 80 Ill. App. 2d 251, 255 N.E.2d
130 (1st Dist. 1967); Israel v. Israel, 8 Ill. App. 2d 284, 131 N.E.2d 555 (2d Dist.
1955) (abstract decision).
17. 11111.43 (1849).
18. See Comment, Measuring the Child's Best Interests-A Study of Incomplete
Considerations, 44 DENVER L.J. 132, 133-34 (1967).
19. 11 Ill. at 49-50.
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as homemakers and fathers as breadwinners compelled the deci-
sion that young children be placed with their mothers. However,
the many changes which have occurred in the traditional socio-eco-
nomic sexual roles since Miner, coupled with the claim that sexual
classifications are impermissible under the Illinois constitution and
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution, demand a re-examination of the tender
years doctrine. This examination is particularly necessary because
the doctrine is premised upon a status-the physiological fact of
motherhood-rather than upon objective factors relating to the
child's 'best interest-the developmental acts of motherhood. The
continued uncritical acceptance and use of the doctrine does not
necessarily serve the best interest of children. 20
The Fifth District Appellate Court in Patton v. Armstrong21 fo-
cused upon this lack of analysis as it significantly undercut the ten-
der years doctrine by concentrating on the factors which are the ba-
sis of the rule itself. The court indicated that ",the mother is given
first preference on the assumption that she will remain in the home
,and thereby be better able to care for the young children on a full
time basis . . . whereas here [the mother] testified* that she was
working during the day and expected to continue to do so."22 In
Patton, many of the underlying reasons which led other courts to
rely upon the presumption did not exist; 'therefore there was simply
no reason to apply the doctrine in this case. The custodial decision
was reached by focusing on factors relating to the best interest of
the child 'and not 'because the father was or was not "equally
gifted in lactation. 23
As previously mentioned, the tender years doctrine may present an
20. See generally Foster & Freed, Child Custody-(Part 1), 39 N.Y.U.L. REV.
423 (1964); Podell, Peck & First, Custody-To Which Parent?, 56 MARQ. L. REV.
51 (1972). That interference with the best interest of the child may occur through
the mechanical use of the doctrine is illustrated by the language used by Justice Un-
derwood in People v. Bukovich, 39 Ill. 2d 76, 83, 233 N.E.2d 382, 386 (1968):
..everybody understands that a mother is better equipped to raise a child than is the
father."
21. 16 Ill. App. 3d 881, 307 N.E.2d 178 (Sth'Dist. 1974).
22. Id. at 882, 307 N.E.2d at 179-80.
23. Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328, 329, 517 P.2d 1019, 1020 (1974). See
also Moezie v. Moezie, No. D3535-71 (D.C. Sup. Ct., Fain. Div. 1973) cited in
K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBERG & H. KAY, SEX BASED DISCRIMINATION 250 (1974).
526 [Vol. 24:521
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impermissible sexual classification under both the Illinois constitu-
tion24 and the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.25 Basing a custody decision on the sex of the parents in-
volves a classification which compels an examination of the un-
derlying state interest. Because the presumption, that the mother
is more able than the father to care for children of tender years,
does not necessarily promote the best interest of the child, there is
not a compelling state interest which would survive a constitutional
challenge. In State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 26 Judge Kooper found
the tender years doctrine interfered with sound custodial determi-
nations. The court held that the doctrine violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment as well as New York
law requiring courts to focus solely upon the best interest of the
child. The New York court specifically recognized no prima facie
right to custody in either parent.
- Discarding the presumption in favor of the mother requires courts
to focus upon factors which directly bear on the child's best interest,
factors which compare the relative abilities of the parents to physi-
cally and emotionally care for and educate minor children. In con-
tested cases wherein the mother is not employed and can provide a
greater degree of care for her minor children than their father, she
will prevail. But in situations where both parents are employed,
the courts will have to explore other factors in making custodial de-
terminations. When judges eliminate this doctrine which has clouded
the real issue, they will come closer to the goal of furthering the best
interest of the child.
FORMER CUSTODY DECREES
The stability and continuity of the child-custodial parent rela-
tionship are important considerations when the non-custodial par-
ent seeks a change in custody. The best interest of the child is not
promoted when the child is "shuttled between contesting parents. '2 7
24. See People v. Ellis, 57 III. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974).
25. State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Family Ct. 1973). See Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). But
see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See generally. Comment, Are Sex-Based
Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 481 (1971).
26. 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Family Ct. 1973).
27. Dokos v. Dokos, 88 I1. App. 2d 330, 334, 232 N.E.2d 508, 511 (Ist Dist.
1967). See, e.g., Wise v. Gillette, 90 Idaho 136, 408 P.2d 806 (1965); Willey v.
1975]
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For a change in custody, there must be a sufficient change of con-
dition in the qualifications of the custodial parent, the quality of
child care, or the quality of the child-custodial parent relation-
ship. Changes concerning the non-custodial parent's qualifications
are often said to be insufficient alone. The rule structure attaches
great weight to continuity and only permits change when it is needed
to promote the best interest of the child.
The Illinois courts recently have found a sufficient change hi
custodial conditions to warrant a change in custody when the con-
duct of the custodial parent was outrageous or the situation posed
a significant danger to the child's development. In Stark v. Stark,"8
the record indicated a sufficient change of condition because the
mother had taught the children to shoplift. Similarly, a sufficient
change was found in Holloway v. Holloway29 when the mother
admitted her inability to care for the child, failed to remain in one
home for any length of time, and entrusted the primary care of the
child to other adults. Likewise, the change in custodial conditions
was ruled sufficient to warrant a change in custody in Sorenson v.
Sorenson,"° where the mother had moved often, was not employed,
and had become intoxicated in front of the child on several occa-
sions. In all three cases the alternative to the existing arrange-
ment was preferable because it better served the child's interest.
Courts have not simply been applying moral judgments in re-
solving these problems. In Fears v. Fears"' the court held that
marijuana use was not, in itself, sufficient to warrant a change of
custody. In Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk12 the court refused to
change custody although the mother had had sexual relations with an
ex-convict prior to their marriage. Thus, in assessing a custodial
parent's qualifications for custody, Van Buskirk reiterates that sex-
ual relations are irrelevant either if a marriage results or if the
mother indicates she will not continue illicit liaisons.
Willey, 235 Iowa 1294, 115 N.W.2d 833 (1962); Hedman v. Hedman, 62 N.W.2d
223 (N.D. 1954).
28. 13 I11. App. 3d 35, 299 N.E.2d 605 (3d Dist. 1973).
29. 10 II1. App. 3d 662, 294 N.E.2d 759 (lst Dist. 1973).
30. 10 Ill. App. 3d 980, 295 N.E.2d 347 (4th Dist. 1973).
31. 5 111. App. 3d 616, 283 N.E.2d 709 (5th Dist. 1972).
32. 19 Ill. App. 3d 647, 312 N.E.2d 395 (2d Dist. 1974).
[Vol. 24:52i
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The significance of the consistency in these decisions cannot be
underestimated. In Reddig v. Reddig,3 the trial court refused to
permit the plaintiff-mother to remove her children to Texas so that
she could remarry. Since she moved to Texas with the children
in spite of the judicial order, the court found her in willful con-
tempt. On appeal, the parties addressed themselves to the cor-
rectness of the trial court's determinations. The Third District Ap-
pellate Court virtually ignored the trial court's decision and con-
centrated on the fact that the children had been in Texas for six
months. The children's interest was of greater concern than either
the question of the correctness of the trial court's determination or
any question of punishment for contempt. The court ordered a
hearing to determine their present well-being but strongly indicated
that, in the absence of a change in circumstances (other than the
move itself) which affected the children's well-being, custody
should remain undisturbed. In Garland v. Garland,34 the mother
had received custody of the children by original agreement. Both
parents were clearly fit, maintained a consistent and beneficial rela-
tionship with their children, and had or planned to remarry. The
mother planned to move to Mississippi to remarry and to obtain
new employment. Although the court recognized that the move in
question would limit the father's visitations and therefore probably
have a deleterious psychological effect on the children, the court
held that the best interest of the children was better served by con-
tinuing custody in the mother.
Recently, doubt has been cast on the application of the change
of condition rule. McDonald v. McDonald,5 decided by the
Fourth District Appellate Court, was a garden variety change of
custody decision,"0 but it contains foreboding language which may
affect the repose of other custody decrees solely based on the par-
ties' agreement. Dicta in that opinion states:
In awarding the custody of the children, the court exercises a judicial
discretion . . . . There is persuasive reasoning in King v. King, 25 Wis.
2d 550, 131 N.W.2d 357, that where custody is awarded upon the stip-
33. 12 I11. App. 3d 1009, 299 N.E.2d 353 (3d Dist. 1973).
34. 19 Il1. App. 3d 951, 312 N.E.2d 811 (1st Dist. 1974).
35. 13 111. App. 3d 87, 299 N.E.2d 787 (4th Dist. 1973).
36. The court concluded "that there is, in fact, such change of condition as
would subject the custody order to modification." Id. at 89, 299 N.E.2d at 789.
1975]
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ulation of the parties and the court receives no evidence upon the best
interests of the child or children, the court does not, in fact, exercise
judicial discretion in awarding custody and that the rule that a custody
order is subject to modification only if there is a substantial change of
condition affecting the child's welfare does not apply.8 7
Formerly, there was but one criterion for modification of any cus-
tody decree: a sufficient change in the condition of the custodial
parent. The McDonald approach diminishes the effect of certain
custody decrees because of its dependence on a threshold determi-
-nation of whether the original custody decree was based on an ade-
quate record. Parties could formerly find finality in decrees and
the rules for modification; the McDonald approach invites non-
custodial parents to seek changes of custody when there is not even
a pretense of a significant change in condition. If this phenome-
non occurs, the stability and continuity of existing custodial ar-
rangements will be impaired and the best interest of the child could
be subordinated.
The McDonald dicta should warn practitioners and trial judges
to develop adequate records. Only then can courts say definitively
that decrees are based on the exercise of judicial discretion, rather
than the agreement of the parties. Clearly delineated reasoning
would supplement and substantiate decrees and the children's in-
terest would remain in the forefront. In cases where existing de7
crees are tenuous because they rest upon agreement of the parties,
courts can avoid the McDonald problem by recognizing the interest
in continuity and assigning to that interest the weight which it de-
servesY8
CONCLUSION
Although the nature of custody determinations demands flexibility
in decision making, the absence of structure invites unnecessary
37. Id.
38. See Willey v. Willey, 253 Iowa 1294, 115 N.W.2d 833 (1962). See generally
GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 6. Section 409 of the UNIFORM MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE AcT (1973) provides one way to insure continuity without jeopardizing
the child's interest:
(a) No motion to modify a custody decree may be made earlier than 2
years after its date, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of
affidavits that there is reason to believe the child's present environment may
endanger'seriously his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.
See 18 ILL. STATE BAR Ass'N, FAMILY L. BULL. No. 1 at 4. (1974)..
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post-decree litigation which wastes judicial resources and may ad-
versely interfere with the stability of custodial relationships. But
flexibility need not mean uncertainty as long as a pattern of rea-
soned elaboration is followed. Uncertainty can be removed and
the best interest of children can be made more ascertainable only
when the courts attempt to identify the interests involved and pro-
vide comprehensively reasoned opinions. Then it can be said that
they are furthering the best interest of children.
